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Change is inevitable - except from a vending machine.

~Robert C. Gallagher

FINDING THE DOOR IN THE MIRAGE

The Politics of Cultural Change in Mongolia

PREFACE
In 1996, as the Mongolian delegation entered the Olympic arena in Atlanta, a
Russian announcer let his tongue slip and heralded the country as a true independent
nation, because nobody depends on them. The comment triggered a scandal which
was suppressed under a deluge of meaningless public apologies, yet merely eight
years later, the Russian announcer’s insult seems to barely even apply anymore. With
Mongolia’s entrance into the international community of interdependents, free from
dictatorial control for the first time during the age of globalization, it has plunged into
an era of change. The outcome of this transitional period will decide the future of the
Mongolian nation.
This essay explores the consequences of Mongolian nomadic cultural change,
the international progression in developing countries away from traditional cultures
into which it fits, and its role in the turbulent political history of Mongolia. This
paper also explores Mongolia’s role as part of a widespread development pattern in
the world today shared by all modernizing nations struggling forward in the shadow
of those democratic giants that they follow so closely. In looking into the Mongolian
case, the hope is to gain a specific perspective on a pervasive effort involving millions
of people across the globe and perhaps shed light on the widespread phenomenon.
What is it about Mongolian traditional culture that clashes with democracy and the
nation’s entrance onto the free market scene? To what extent is this part of a larger
global trend away from traditional cultures and towards modernization along capitalist
lines? How will this affect Mongolia in the future?

The paper is divided into three sections. Part 1 focuses on the origins of the
Mongolian nomadic cultural heritage, a discussion of nomadic traditional values, and
the affects that the Soviets had on customary Mongolian culture. Part 2 focuses on an
anthropologically informed discussion of three different types of indicators currently
pervasive throughout Mongolia, showing the clash of traditional values and heritage
with modernization reforms. Part 3 discusses the democratic era in Mongolia, the
political ramifications of cultural change, the markers of modernization already
becoming visible throughout the country, and what the future may hold
All of the personal research for this paper was conducted in Mongolia, using
field based methods of interviewing and observation throughout the country.
Statistical information collected from nomadic family interviews comes from roughly
30 interviews conducted across the Gobi region, in Darkhan in the North, and in
Delgerkhan on the central Mongolian steppe. A map of the areas visited can be found
in Appendix B. 1 The statistical information collected from nomadic families is
reflected in the graph in Appendix A. 2 All other personal observations come from
four months of living, eating, and breathing the Mongolian cultural, geographical, and
political climate.
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PART 1: N O M A D I C C U L T U R A L L E G A C Y A N D T H E S O V I E T E R A
Culture is roughly anything we do and the monkeys don't.
~Lord Raglan
NOMADIC CULTURE

Mongolia’s nomadic tradition is one of the oldest surviving cultural heritages
in the modern world. It is generally estimated that nomadic pastoralism originated
roughly 11,000 years ago, representing a considerable advancement in human
evolution away from the primitive hunter gatherer way of life. This new lifestyle led
to mobile communities of herders who were able to produce most of the basic
resources needed for daily life, relying mainly on meat products and animal skins to
feed them and to protect them from the harsh Mongolian climate. Yet the nomadic
pastoralists lacked specialization, rendering the tribes unable to trade internally for
various peripheral commodities. 3 This shortcoming was exacerbated as new
civilizations grew up in the south, agriculturally based civilizations occupying more
forgiving climate zones which enabled specialization and trade. For the fierce
nomadic tribes in the north whose mobility and animal skills led naturally to a
proficiency in warfare, the easiest and most logical way to acquire these peripheral
goods was through the ritualistic raiding of the southern towns and villages. 4
For thousands of years the raiding cycle continued. Tribes inhabiting current
day Mongolia became known as fierce and barbaric warriors, pillaging and plundering
towns and cities alike throughout northern Asia in order to acquire what they needed
to bolster their pastoralist way of life. Over the course of history, as these raids
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became more audacious, less associated with immediate need than with domination,
Mongolia became associated with fear and conquest. Led by Attila the “Scourge of
God”, the Huns fought their way all the way from the Mongolian lands to the walls of
Rome, helping the Goths and Vandals bring that ancient civilization to its end.
Centuries later the rise of Chiingis Khan, the uniting of the Mongol Hordes, and the
following rape and conquest of most of the known world cemented Mongolia’s legacy
as a nation of outstanding warriors, rooted primarily in their nomadic way of life and
mastery of horseback riding and weaponry.
By 1900, though all aspirations of conquest had been hammered out of the
Mongolian people by 200 years of Manchu domination, nomadic pastoralism still
thrived on the north Asian steppe. Yet contrary to the romantic views of many
westerners, nomadic life did not entail, as it had not since before the Middle Ages,
freewheeling nomads traipsing across the steppes as they liked, responsible to no on
but themselves and their animals. In fact, since the thirteenth century “land, livestock,
and even people of the commoner class, were conceived of as constituent elements of
an inclusivist socio-political domain under the jurisdiction of an enfeoffed noble.” 5
This meant that in very real terms Mongolian nomads were living in a state relatively
comparable to feudalism, a state in which the vast majority of the population worked
under, and was protected by, an elite group of ruling nobles. This rendered upward
mobility impossible except by birthright, yet kept the nomadic people protected
through adjunct unifications under ruling lords. Within this communal feudalistic
infrastructure the nomadic way of life prevailed for over 700 years.
Nomadic herding in Mongolia is an anomaly the world over as one of the last
surviving cultural legacies of the old world. By the early 20th century, pastoral life on
5
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the Mongolian steppe had changed very little since the times of Chiingis Khan when
compared with global cultural advancement. Even after 70 years of Soviet
communist domination, nomadic pastoralism is still alive and functioning in the
Mongolian countryside. Many traditional cultural values inherited down through the
lineages of herding families have also survived to this day in Mongolia along with
nomadism itself, yet the pastoral way of life may now be meeting its greatest
challenge since the Stone Age: the advent of democracy, free market reforms, and the
capitalist ideology.
Mongolian nomadic people are strong, peaceful natured, family loving
individuals who value work, respect, and generosity highly. They have been hewn
from the rock of Mongolian hospitality, a harsh environment where it is not often easy
to survive in the open countryside and correspondingly have historically lived a life
based more on necessity than desire. In addition, health is valued highly, although
less so than the above, as is education, yet nomads whom I interviewed tended to see
these as being recent developments, as recent as the turn of the last century. An
explanation for this could be the historical lack of contact nomads have had with the
outside world. Until the Soviet period, nomads lived beyond the reach of most media
outlets and schooling opportunities, deemphasizing globally evolving values of long
life and education.
The most notable characteristic of Mongolian nomadic society is the emphasis
on family life and communal living. Of those interviewed, just under 50% identified
living with family as their most important value, another 20% placing it in their top
three values. Coming from a culture of ger living this is not difficult to understand.
The one room traditional felt ger, the Mongolian nomadic home for thousands of
years, usually houses most of the members of the family. When children become old

enough to marry and move away they more often than not stay nearby, occasionally
even staying in the family ger with their spouse until they inherit it. As the
Mongolian climate is nearly always chilly and is vastly colder during some of the year,
the majority of time in the country is spent inside the one room ger where frostbite is
less likely. In addition, even when family members do move away, they usually stay
relatively close to their parents and siblings so that members of the family can help
one another with the many arduous herding tasks, lessening the load. This tradition
has led to a legacy of group herding among nomads in Mongolia that not only applies
to family, but also to friends and neighbors. In a culture that has grown out of a frigid
land in which survival is often a proactive skill and living space is always sparse,
cohabitating with family and working with neighbors have become more than values;
they have become routinized necessities.
There is also a strong emphasis on happiness in Mongolian nomadic culture
which is inexorably linked to peace and a calm way of life. Of those interviewed,
70% listed happy living as one of their three most important values, most of those
people listing it second to family life and the welfare of their children. Of that 70%,
almost 40% linked happy living with peacefulness, a calm life, or generosity towards
others. This touches on a central point in nomadic culture. It is not surprising that
happiness is highly valued, I am confident that this point is the same in most cultures
around the world, what is interesting is what the nomads interviewed indicated as
leading to happiness; calm dispositions and peaceful atmospheres. In this perception
of happiness, feelings of rage, disappointment, confusion, etc., are to some degree
subjugated by the general impulse to keep a calm and peaceful home. For example,
when asking about the appropriateness of showing love, the responses were identical
across the boards. Love is something to be felt not spoken, experienced not seen.

Erdene-Ochir, a biology teacher in Bulgan sum who runs a vegetable garden next to
his ger on the outskirts of town told me of an old wives tale he had heard from some
nomad friends living deeper in the countryside. They had told him that if one kisses
too much, one’s lips will begin to hurt and it will become “not so tasteful” anymore. 6
He laughed throughout the story, but the people who told him certainly didn’t find it
as amusing. The dominant force in nomadic tradition is not to vent feelings, as is the
case in many modern cultures; it is to subdue them in order to further a peaceful way
of life on the surface as trouble is dealt with on an internal level below the line of
sight.
Only 40% of people interviewed listed work as a top value, but 75% of those
responses were listed as the number one priority. Mongolian nomadic society values
work highly. Living in a ger for a single day this becomes apparent as one observes
the diligence with which the men take care of the animals and the women take care of
the house. This may be true more so now than in the Soviet period when animals
were state owned and personal incentives were limited to cheaply made plaques, yet
of those interviewed most thought a strong work ethic had been around long before
the Soviets were. However even though the roots of this work ethic were
undoubtedly founded on the difficulty of the herding lifestyle and the need to work to
stay afloat, incentives are currently changing along with the political structures.
Monkhchimeg, a nomad living outside of Hambog sum who is planning to settle this
year, regarded work as a quantifiable income. The harder he works, the more he
makes, the higher he can climb on the social ladder. During our interview, he did not
tell me work was important; he told me income was. 7 Already the incentives are
changing, even in the countryside.
6
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THE SOVIET ERA

There have been few threats to the nomadic pastoralist way of life in its long
history on the Mongolian steppe. Up until the arrival of the Soviets, Mongolia’s vast
plains remained reasonably isolated from exterior contact beyond China and any sort
of influence that could have disrupted nomadic life. Thus due to the geographical
location of Mongolia, the harshness of the climate, and general undesirability of the
land, nomadic culture and its semi-feudal political accessory survived relatively
untouched into the early 20th century. What is unprecedented on the global scale is
not that nomadic culture survived that far, however, it is that it survived the next 70
years within the confines of a radically different political ideology, a time during
which most of the other lingering traditional cultures of the world began to die away
in the face of modernization. However, through a closer examination of the overlap
between the nomadic feudalist way of life and Soviet aspirations for Mongolia, the
possibility becomes clear that the Soviets purposefully preserved nomadic life,
enclosing it in a time capsule wherein it was able to flourish far beyond its natural
lifespan.
As opposite as a nomadic society may seem to a communist dictatorship at
first view, in Mongolia, they were “surprisingly compatible”. 8 Before the Soviet
takeover in 1921, nomads had owned their own animals on an individual basis, yet
herded them on land owned and controlled by feudal lords. Under the new Soviet
arrangement, the power structure was shifted to the negdel, a newly created
organizational grouping constituting a community of herders. The purpose of the
negdel was to transform the feudal society into a Soviet communist one through an
equal paring of all goods across the communities. To this end the negdel became the
8
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owner of all land and livestock, with individual animal stocks and pastureland
distributed by the governor of the negdel, inevitably a member of the Revolutionary
Party. 9 Each herder was assigned roughly the same amount of livestock and provided
extra provisions by the umbrella government organizations, making all herders
roughly equal in terms of their holdings, no matter how hard they worked. Although
this represented a shift in the organization and control of the nomadic way of life, it
represented a relatively small change in the nomadic lifestyle. As the Soviets had
“inherited a society in which pastoralism and political hierarchy were [already]
inextricably combined”, the transition to communism in Mongolia was much
smoother and more effective than it was in many of the Eastern European satellite
states. 10
As the Soviets dismantled the neo-feudal Mongolian hierarchy, just as the
Chinese Communists would later do in Tibet, a new collective based nomadic
infrastructure grew up. During the first 15 years of this new system the size of the
national herd increased over 15 million animals, or about 150%. 11 This could have
been due to lower rates of animal slaughter because it was governmentally controlled,
or simply due to an institutionalized work ethic that outstripped that of the neo-feudal
system. Based on responses I received during my interviews throughout the
countryside, the former seems more likely.
Of the people interviewed, the overwhelming sentiment was that Soviet
communism did in fact work well with the nomadic herding lifestyle, even if it was
nowhere near optimal. Most people separated the fact that they did not like the Soviet
period quite efficiently from their opinions of its effectiveness. One person I
interviewed in the Gobi, a camel herder who lived practically in the shadow of the
9
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Flaming Cliffs, said she thought communism worked for some people, but not for
others. 12 Bantzragch, a 63 year old settled herder, told me that while state animals
were “not great, most everyone had enough and it was not bad.” 13 Those were the
two responses that strayed farthest away from the usual “Yes, communism worked
well with nomadic herding” that I received over and over again. Most of the herders I
interviewed also believed that group herding having existed before the arrival of the
Soviets eased the transition into communism. As most of them were yet to have been
born during that time, these sentiments came largely from what their parents had told
them of nomadic customs before 1920. Nomadic herding worked, I believe for the
above reasons, more efficiently with communism than perhaps any other culture that
encountered the Soviets, yet simply because nomads were able to tolerate the system
does not imply that they liked it.
When asked whether families preferred the communist or the new democratic
free market system, the response was almost always an endorsement of the latter.
One herder called their livestock under communism “punishment animals”, citing that
when they were injured or died the families had to pay the government out of their
own pockets. 14 Another herder living outside of Hambog referred to the communist
period as “difficult and insane” and he was hard pressed to say anything past that. 15
Yet although the vast majority said that they prefer democracy, about 90%, the above
two cases were relatively unique in the rancor held against the Soviets. Most herders
said simply that life was inherently and unavoidably mediocre or satisfactory during
the Soviet era, but now they can make their lives better through diligence and hard
work. Dorj, a 54 year old who was a state worker during the communist period but

12

Tsetsegdelger, Nomadic Interview
B. Banzragch, Nomadic Interview
14
Erdene-Ochir
15
Monkhchimeg
13

has now retired as a herder, summed up popular sentiment towards the era quite
nicely. “It seemed like during communism people were fine, but now they are a little
more fine.” 16 Most herders appear to be pleased with the current system, while at the
same time not totally disenchanted with communism.
It seems that nomadic culture and the herding lifestyle, while working just
well enough with communism, as exemplified by the relatively peaceful nature of the
time, never really provided communism with an enthusiastic home base of support.
However the apathetic support of communism by the nomads can be seen in the lack
of revolts or any type of resistance to the Soviet impositions during the period. There
were of course other factors that led to the apathy, such as the lack of foreign
instigation in wrestling Mongolia away from the Soviets, or the distance of so many
of the rural population from information outlets. Yet in practice, the complete lack of
nomadic movement against the Soviets does denote the historical presence of a sort of
indifferent, if not active, support of the communist agenda. However on the other
hand, the majority of those interviewed today say that they did not favor communism,
and that democracy is their choice for Mongolia.
Using the relative historical peacefulness and interview responses as indicators
of the sentiment of the times, I have concluded that while not many people were
actually tied to the communist ideology during the Soviet era, it did fit well with the
Mongolian culture as affected by the predominant nomadic tradition. This in addition
to the distance of most people from the cities, absence of media in the country, and
lack of foreign imperial instigation, resulted in an anomalously calm Soviet period.
Consequently there was no viable reason for the Soviets to disturb the nomadic way
of life; it helped them to maintain control while enduring the least resistance that they
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received in any satellite nation. Cocooned away in the folds of Soviet protection,
hidden from the advances of foreign culture through the censorship of global media,
nomadic tradition survived into the 21st century, outstripping its contemporary
cultures by an unprecedented amount. Yet with the current democratic and free
market reforms in Mongolia, the traditional culture that has survived thousands of
years may finally be starting to decay into the history books whose pages have long
since been filled with the annals of its descendants.

THE NOMADIC LEGACY: FOLLOW THE RURAL LEADER

The Soviets may have preserved nomadic tradition, yet their influences on
both that cultural legacy and the course of Mongolian politics were far from benign.
The Soviets brought globalization to Mongolia communist style. Under the ever
paranoid supervision of the communist elites, that meant opening Mongolia to the
Soviet Union, and to the Soviet Union alone. This faux-internationalization coincided
with an intensely strong movement towards citification in Mongolia as the Soviets
bolstered city industries in order to foster a proletarian workforce. Varying statistical
data indicates that urbanization in Mongolia rose from below 40% in the 1930s, to
almost 55% in the early 1990s, a quantifiably large jump. 17 Yet without true access to
global media this migration led to a half-growth, a sort of stunted transition in which
country culture was in large part brought into the city for lack of any other foreign
imported city-bred culture to fill the void. Left to develop their own city identity
under the watchful eye of the Revolutionary Party elites, country born Mongolians
infused the cities with a new hybrid culture, a culture born from the intermingling of
age old country customs with a new city lifestyle in which they did not necessarily fit.
17
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With the international disintegration of the Soviet Union, this quirky hybrid culture
found in the cities is now facing the challenge of adapting to a new political landscape
devoid of protection, changed daily by the rapid influx of modern amenities bundled
along with cultural incentives.
Examples of how country culture was imported into the city under Soviet
protection are evident in every corner of Ulan Baatar. One of the most striking
examples is the continued tradition of family living in the city. Having moved into a
completely different context, a context offering arrangements that are not limited to
one room gers alone on the steppe, family bonds have stayed incredibly strong in the
city. Those living in the hybrid culture, in the cities, have retained their strong sense
of individuality within family, not hinging personal independence on leading a life
detached from one’s parents. In many developed western countries people find it
difficult to define their own individuality without being physically alone, materially
cutting the bonds that tie them to their dependencies, yet in Mongolia this is not the
case. The traditional value of family life has carried into the cities, even though this is
not a conventional value in most western cities across the world. It is a nomadic
cultural leftover.
Likewise young marriage has remained customary in the cities. Demographic
surveys conducted in Mongolia from 1996 to 1998 showed that the average age at
first marriage was 17.5 regardless of the regional development. 18 The surveys further
showed that the median ages of marriage in rural and urban areas were strikingly
similar at 20.6 and 20.9, respectively. 19 These figures are remarkable when compared
with the average marriage ages in either America or countries of the European Union.
In America, according to the 2000 survey, women marry at an average age of 25.1,
18
19

UNESCO Statistical Database, www.unescobkk.org/ips/arhweb/demographics/mongolia2.cfm
Ibid.

with men marrying on average 2 years later at 26.8 years old. 20 In addition,
American marriage rates are consistently higher in cities than in rural areas. These
numbers are similar to numbers recorded across Europe and are almost identical to
those found in Canada. 21 In Mongolia, however, marriage rates are almost equal in
rural and urban areas, emphasizing a common western cultural shift that did not take
place during the citification of the country.
In addition, country food is still eaten to a large extent in the cities, with
international restaurants only now beginning to slowly spring up in the absence of
Soviet culinary control. Households in Ulan Baatar usually serve traditional country
meals several, if not many, times per week. I can attest to this based on personal
knowledge and through the experiences of my friends. In addition, Buuz (a traditional
Mongolia mutton dumpling of sorts) restaurants, or buuz places, line the streets of
Ulan Baatar and can be found in all other provincial capitals and cities as well. If the
town is big enough for a restaurant, it is big enough for a buuz place.
Cultural outlets such as studio art and music in the city also still revolve
around country themes. A trip to any art museum in Ulan Baatar instantly reveals the
modern Mongolian artists obsession with country subjects. There are few paintings or
works of sculpture in the museums which are not focused on the romanticism of
horses, or the nomadic pastoral way of life in one way or another. Likewise most
Mongolian music still hails from country themes, having lyrics that focus on country
topics like the mountains, the wind, the earth, etc. Atypical to this would be the
contemporary rap and hip hop culture currently growing in Ulan Baatar, yet this in no
way was around before the Soviet crumble. In this light the movement is more of an
indicator of the change that the Soviets prevented for 70 years than of anything else.
20
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Nomadic cultural heritage was brought into the cities, as seen by the above
indicators, yet it also morphed in many ways into a culture that would work within the
confines of city life with the addition of Soviet values. This can be seen even in the
language, which although Mongolians might not take lightly to this comparison,
sounds to a foreigner like a direct mix of Hungarian, Chinese and Russian.
Traditional language ran into barriers in the city as new Soviet imports had names that
could not fit within the confines of traditional language. Thus Soviet words were
introduced to make the language usable in the city. Likewise vodka was adopted as
the defacto national drink, more of a cultural icon from the Soviets than anything else,
cities grew up around buildings constructed in the Soviet concrete block style, and
education and health care became primary social focuses. All of these introductions
and more added a distinctly Soviet flavor to the new hybrid Mongolian culture and its
evolving surroundings.
The hybrid culture born out of the meeting of traditional nomadic pastoralism
and Soviet reforms, however, is having difficulty integrating into the new democratic
free marketocracy currently being built from the ground up in Mongolia. It is simply
not compatible with the ideals of democracy and the situations standard in a market
economy with free international exchange of not only goods, but also of ideas and
values. This has led to a host of congruency problems currently endemic throughout
Mongolia, but most apparent in the cities, the battlegrounds where hundreds of years
of cultural advancement throughout the world are meeting a hybrid culture built from
an outdated legacy and a crumbled supranational ideology. This struggle between
hybrid culture and modern values is mimicking Mongolia’s current democratization
process step for step. The outcome will decide the path that the Mongolian nation
follows into the post-industrial, capitalist world.

PART 2: CULTURAL RESISTANCE TO A CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY
If the Aborigine drafted an I.Q. test, all of Western civilization
would presumably flunk it.
~Stanley Garn

There are currently a rash of indicators in Mongolia, predominantly seen in
towns and cities, stemming from and describing the clash of new customs and
technology with a modern Mongolian culture formed under the influence of
traditional nomadic heritage and Soviet reforms. As these indicators are most visible
in urban areas filled with the above described Mongolian hybrid culture, they are
predominantly the result of that same hybrid culture clashing with modern influx
trends historically shielded by the Soviets from entering Mongolia. These indicators
fall into two categories, those that stem directly from nomadic traditional culture as it
was filtered into the hybrid culture, and those that stem from a predominantly Soviet
influence on the hybrid culture. A third category is characterized by indicators that
arise from a premature Mongolian desire to become westernized, or as I argue,
Americanized, without the infrastructural or cultural framework to become so. This
final section focuses on the difficulty in integrating new institutions, institutions born

largely in western countries where a long line of tradition has supported them, into a
civil society that has no moral, cultural, or historical framework to substantiate their
integration.
HERITAGE INDICATORS

The odd nature of dance clubs in Ulan Baatar, and in Aimag and Sum centers
throughout Mongolia, is a prime example of the way in which traditional cultural
values are currently clashing with modern changes. In Ulan Baatar there are
numerous dancing clubs, disco clubs, and karaoke clubs. In the fourth district alone
there are over 30 clubs. These clubs emulate western nightclubs as evidenced by their
undeniable similarity in structure and attitude to clubs throughout Europe and the
Americas, yet there is one thing missing; in clubs throughout Mongolia, men and
women never dance together. Ever. In the west, clubs evolved in societies that had
grown accustomed to outwards displays of affection as places where this sort of
activity would be explicitly facilitated. In the west, dance clubs virtually exist so that
men and women can dance together, and often it does not stop there. In Mongolia this
is as of yet unheard of. This clearly touches on the traditional Mongolian sensitivity
to public displays of affection which stemmed originally from nomadic cultural
values as discussed above and has yet to change. Nevertheless, it is particularly
strange to have clubs wherein the sole purpose is to display some sort of affection
while dancing, in which it is taboo to do so. The confused nature of Mongolian
nightclubs is a prime example of Mongolians desiring, and beginning to integrate, a
distinctly western phenomenon while still clinging to a culture that is not entirely
prepared for it.
The usage of cell phones across Mongolian cities is another flagrant example
of a cultural clash. Cell phones are unbelievably popular in Ulan Baatar. Although

cell phone data has not yet been compiled in any formal way in Mongolia, about 90%
of people I have met in Ulan Baatar over the age of 12 have cell phones. This is
higher than the percentage of my friends and relatives at home who have cell phones,
which is only surprising in contrast to the otherwise underdeveloped nature of the
Mongolian infrastructure. Yet although almost everyone in Ulan Baatar has a cell
phone, there is less culture attached to the use of cell phones than any other example
in this section. People simply have no moral framework to guide cell phone use in the
city, allowing phone conversations to disrupt almost anything else. I have
experienced a waiter picking up a cell phone while taking my order in a restaurant and
a cashier in a supermarket pause to answer the phone instead of handing me my
change. At school, multiple lecturers have picked up their cell phones in the middle
of their talks, answered them, and actually held a conversation while postponing the
lecture indefinitely without a word to the students. Incidentally when an American
lady who lives in Mongolia came to speak to us and her cell phone went off during
her lecture, she quickly donned a very embarrassed look as she rushed to turn it off,
apologizing as she went. There is simply no conception of how to use all these cell
phones in a conscientious way that does not lead to numerous disturbances. It is easy
to import cell phones from overseas, yet vastly more difficult to import a cultural
awareness of their place in society.
The clash is even apparent in the structure of Ulan Baatar itself. Ulan Baatar
was been designed to allow for automobile transportation, but barely. There are cars,
but a striking lack of crosswalks, stoplights, or sidewalks for pedestrians to go along
with them. Even on this physical structural level, the battle between cultural tradition
and modern amenities is apparent. Cars are flooding in through the newly opened
international market doorway, yet the city is not really structured to provide vehicles

with a rational place. This has led to many accidents per year in addition to injuries
and fatalities in car related incidences in Ulan Baatar. Although official figures are
bizarrely absent from most statistical databases on Mongolia, every family I spoke
with in the city confirmed that a lot of people are injured or killed in a lot of car
accidents every year. It is another example of a modern amenity lacking the cultural,
or in this case even material, infrastructure to support its introduction in a cogent way.
On the lighter side, Lonely Planet offers this reassuring advice about Mongolia: “Be
aware that petrol can be hard to find; accidents, unfortunately, are not”. 22
Free market reforms come along with many new job openings in many sectors,
predominantly service oriented sectors, yet as with the above indicators, there is little
if any culture to support the introduction of service jobs in Mongolia. As seen in the
profile of nomadic cultural values, there is a strong emphasis on generosity and the
will to do for others in Mongolian traditional culture. It is my hypothesis that this
legacy has led to service workers in the city, in many instances, feeling as if the job
they do should be being done as a favor to their paying customers. As such the
customers should be thankful beyond the money they are paying, as they are being
done a favor. Yet at the same time, many of these service jobs are not strikingly
pleasant, it turns out, which has caused servers to dislike their jobs. Since tipping is
not only uncommon but discouraged, as that would offend the generosity side of
service that is still lingering in the Mongolian mentality, there is no incentive for the
service people to do a good job. They do not wholly believe in the generosity aspect
anymore as their jobs have become routinized and dull, resulting in a scenario where,
without the institutionalization of tipping, they have no incentive to do a good job.
Numerous examples can be found in restaurants, on trains, in cheep hotels, and
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especially in taxi’s. Once I was in a taxi when the driver got out and started fighting
with another man in the middle of the street, leaving me alone in the taxi in the middle
of nowhere. Another time my taxi ran out of gas in the middle of a four lane highway.
Even though the trains in this country are remarkably nice and efficient, much more
so than in America, the train workers are far from charming and often treated me as
though they were paying me to ride the train. Unfortunately that was not the case.
Far from being a blatant complaint about the nature of Mongolian society, the
examination of service in this country provides insights into the ways in which culture
has fallen behind political and social developments. The question is how long this
can last.
Even in the countryside, which inevitably is reached later by developments
initiated in the cities, clashing ideologies and desires can be seen in plain view. With
the fall of communism, televisions, DVD players, and computers all began rushing
into Mongolia at an incredibly accelerated rate. Even this tremendous influx,
however, could hardly satisfy the Mongolian information craving in the city, not to
mention the countryside. Today an estimated “50 to 60 percent of households have
TV sets” in Mongolia. 23 However over 60% of the families I interviewed in the
countryside alone had TV sets, almost 80% of those families also having satellite
dishes. The data I collected makes me think that the previous statistics are
underestimating TV ownership nationwide by a substantial amount. Either way, this
is a large jump from the amount of technological communications available before the
collapse of the Soviet Union only 14 short years ago. During my interviews, every
single family with a television reported having purchased their first television after
1990. This phenomenon created a substantial rise in the amount of technology both in
23
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the cities and in the countryside and in the spread of information throughout Mongolia
in the post Soviet years. Today, even families in the deepest areas of the countryside
can learn about events happening across the globe, becoming educated as to their
surroundings both on a national and on an international level.
However these new amenities also come with problems, kinks that have yet to
be worked out. Televisions were not designed for one room environments, and gers
are the poster child for that type of living situation. From my experiences living in
both gers in Delgerkhan in central Mongolia and Darkhad in the far north, this often
led to conflicts. More often than not, half of the family would want to watch
television and the other half would not, yet in a one room home with inhospitable
temperatures outside, there was no choice. It was wonderful to be able to see the awe
in the eyes of those watching television for the first decade in their lives, the
amazement at such a new technology, yet at the same time the upcoming changes
were apparent even in these early stages. With a television it is very useful to have a
second room, and with a second room it is harder, perhaps even impossible, to move.
In this culturally set up dilemma, nomads had the television, but no suitable
environment in which to watch it. They had the goods, but not the cultural framework
to support the new imports. Gers just don’t come standard with television parlors; at
least not yet.
THE SOVIET INFLUENCED INDICATORS

There is currently a large drinking problem Mongolia. Since the Soviet era,
there has been a substantial increase in the rate of alcoholism in Mongolia. 24 Today,
the estimated rate is above 20%, meaning that one in five Mongolians is an
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alcoholic. 25 If those figures applied to SIT and its students, 5 of us would be
alcoholics. It is telling that in a country where the vast majority of males, and most
females, smoke cigarettes, alcohol poisoning both over the short and long term
consistently beats out respiratory disease as the number three killer of Mongolians. 26
Unsurprisingly, circulatory disease ranks first given the heavy meat and fat diet,
almost tripling the rates of respiratory and poisoning mortalities.
Sambo, a 72 year old nomad living in the far north of Darkhad, gave me a
particularly insightful reason for the substantial increase in alcohol abuse since the
Soviet collapse. He told me that during the communist period there had been a
consciousness of elders that related to, among other things, drinking habits. There
were no set laws, but it was universally accepted that at 40 one started drinking a little
bit, at 50 one could drink as one liked, and at 60 one could go “overboard”. 27
However under the new democratic system everyone has become theoretically equal,
even across age lines. A misinterpretation, or even abuse, of that has led to people
dismantling the old drinking culture and drinking whenever they want in order to
celebrate their freedom and equality. This is an interesting case because during
communism there was already an established drinking culture that accompanied the
copious amounts of alcohol provided by the Soviets. In this situation it isn’t that a
new commodity is being introduced due to free market reforms, but that new social
reforms are being interpreted such that the old drinking customs have been abandoned
without replacement while the liquor continues be present. That has created a
different kind of clash between old and new; the vodka has been around for
generations, but with the introduction of the new system, there is no longer a rational
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place for it to fit within the changing culture. This has led, at least in part, to the
unprecedented rise in alcoholism.
Another puzzling phenomenon is that of voting in Mongolia. The voting rates
in Mongolia are incredibly high. During the parliamentary elections of 1992, 98% of
registered voters turned out to choose their first free parliament. 28 By 1996 these
numbers had dropped to 88.39% and in 2000 they dropped even further to 82.4%, still
well above the global averages. Furthermore, turnout for the 1993 Presidential
election was recorded at 96.3% of the total voting age population, a number which
rose almost unbelievably to 100% in 2000. 29 What is more, of all the herders I
interviewed throughout Mongolia, every single one votes, and none of them have ever
heard of any one eligible not voting. All in all Mongolia has averaged a voter turnout
of 82.4% of the voting age population, ranking 24 in the world. 30 To add some
perspective, the United States is ranked at 139th with a historical participation average
slightly over 50% (although this does not take into account the recent American
presidential election which might bolster that figure to some extent, albeit minimal).
What is even more interesting, however, is that voter participation is so high in a
country where the amount of information received by the majority of the population is
so low. Furthermore, many of my interview accounts verify that apathy is common
among nomadic herdsmen as they doubt to some extent what affect the different
parties can have on their lives, as removed from the urban centers as they are. This
raises the question of what propels such an astonishingly high rate of politically
under-educated, apathetic, voters to the polls.
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When asked why they thought the rates of voting were so high, many nomads
that I interviewed said they thought it was because people here are simply more active
than people in countries who have long since taken their freedom for granted after
years of habitual liberties. I believe this to be one of the main reasons for the high
voting rates, yet I believe that there is also another dominant reason. Having lived
under dictators for so long without the civil liberties taken for granted in most western
nations, I simply do not think Mongolians have yet registered on a conscious level
that they are free to not vote. In this light the phenomenal voter turnout is partially a
legacy of doing what one is told, which would explain high voting rates even in the
face of low information availability and general political apathy throughout the
countryside. In this somewhat demented case, the legacy of anti-democratic rule that
dominated civil culture for so long may actually be assisting voting rates in the new
democratic era.
Another mark of the Soviet era is the way in which people treat queues in
Mongolia. Lines in this country are very rarely respected at all. Usually if one
doesn’t push to some extent, it can take an hour to move three feet closer to checkout
in a supermarket as people seem to keep materializing in the space between. This
may seem like a small, even trite observation, yet it has cultural ramifications that are
important for the featured discussion. The mentality that upholds culturally
institutionalized cutting and shoving is not one that has historically fared well with
democratic marketocracies that run on a certain civil order and professional
expediency. In reference to interview responses across the boards, this is not a
cultural trait that seems to have come from the nomadic way of life. I find it more
likely that this cultural phenomenon evolved either during the Soviet era in the city
when many middle class workers were hard pressed to maintain the lives they knew

before communism, or more probably, from as recently as the 1990 switch to
democracy. With poverty at an all time low and the nation using a card system and in
some cases bread lines, it is not hard to see where an acceptability of and movement
towards cutting and pushing in lines to get ahead could have been born. Either way,
the disregard for lines is a cultural institution that has outlived its usability within the
national system, another anachronism that will soon begin to deteriorate under the
weight of the new capitalist democracy.
The above indicators are a tangible result of modernity coming to Mongolia
that might have happened no matter what the circumstances. Yet they have been
undeniably exacerbated by their political surroundings. A loss of Soviet control
married with the influx of hundreds of year’s worth of other nations’ progress,
enacted by a culture that sprung from nomadism, is having understandable difficulties
working out the numerous cricks. The same might have happened even if Mongolia
had stayed Soviet, yet it is doubtful as in that case scenario the country would have
remained controlled, not truly opened to the outside world. In the end it is a
historian’s dilemma; there is no way to know if the above would have played out had
the Soviet Union not crumbled and still retained Mongolia as its Asian satellite.
However the reality is that, the circumstances as they were, the above indicators have
risen to the surface. In the very real power vacuum of Soviet dispersal, new moral,
ethical, and ideological infrastructures of normalcy are being created, to some degree
necessitating the dismantlement of those influences that the Soviets had on the
Mongolian hybrid culture.
THE THIRD NEIGHBOR INDICATORS

In 1990, then US Secretary of State James Baker introduced to Mongolia his
concept of a “third neighbor”. Baker’s theory was that Mongolia, in an effort to move

away from the legacy of previous totalitarian regimes, could look to the international
community of democracies for support as their “third neighbor”. 31 As Mongolia has
co-opted Baker’s model during the 14 years since the Soviet collapse, western
influence has, for the first time in a century, begun to infiltrate Mongolian society.
This has led to cultural clashes which represent a premature desire to westernize while
still retaining a cultural legacy not entirely prepared for change. The new
understanding of a pan-global consciousness, previously held out by the Soviets, is
causing a predominant desire among Mongolians, especially those of the younger
generations, to westernize. Yet many Mongolians, predominantly those of the older
generations, still find themselves holding onto cultural traditions that are strained to
accommodate democracy. These modernization desires, and resulting confusion, can
be seen in the following indicators.
Although Mongolia is one of the only modernizing countries in the world
where McDonald’s has not yet dared to go, fast food American style is beginning to
become popular in Ulan Baatar, even if only as a concept. Various burger joint
imitations are springing up around town, the most conspicuous of which was the
scandalous MonRonald’s which was forced to change names shortly after opening
due to international copy write laws. The restaurant now simply has a large sign
which reads “Burger”, written in yellow on red, the McDonald’s colors. One can
even still see the outline of the title MonRonald’s on the sign below the shoddy
repainting job. What is interesting about all these imitation burger joints, however, is
not that they are infringing on international copy write laws, but that they are slower
and more expensive than most traditional buuz places in Ulan Baatar. Burgers cost
two dollars on average, whereas an entire meal can be bought in a traditional guanz,
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or café, for under a dollar. Likewise, food in traditional Mongolian cafés is brought
out amazingly fast. I am always astounded when I place an order in a buuz place how
fast the food is brought to the table; it is as if my arrival was premeditated by the staff
who also managed to preordain what I would be ordering, having it ready for me as
soon as I sat down. McDonald’s in America is nowhere near that fast. In this way if
McDonald’s ever does get to Mongolia, which it most surely will, it won’t really be
fast food at all. It this culture it will be comparatively slow, and most probably not
cheap. It will, however, most definitely be American, its only true selling point.
What is more, people I have talked to throughout the city of the younger generation
who have traveled abroad would welcome American fast food chains. Not because
they are cheap or fast, but because they like the food; they have bitten into the image.
In my mind this shows an increasingly pervasive, at least in the city, Mongolian desire
to Americanize.
Due to the way in which foreign sport was integrated into the Mongolian
lifestyle late in its developmental stage, post citification, yet at a point where most
international information still only trickled into the cities, basketball became the
preeminent foreign-imported sport. Basketball, the city sport, was a natural choice
over soccer, the true international sport, as space for soccer fields in cities is hard to
come by. As the information of new sports did not make it into the countryside, there
was no viable way to import soccer as an international phenomenon, leading to a
striking predominance of basketball as the idolized sport in Mongolia. Just like in
America.
Foreign media, particularly American and South Korean, is idealized in the
city centers of Mongolia. When one turns on the TV in Ulan Baatar at least half, if
not more, of the channels will inevitably be running American movies or South

Korean soap operas. There are more American movies on television in Ulan Baatar in
one day than I get on my television at my home in New York in a week. Every night
there are at least three, if not four, Korean soap operas on different channels on
television which families watch with ritualistic vigilance. American media even
carries into the deep countryside. Otgon, a 60 year old herder settled in the middle of
the Gobi far from any sum center, with two permanent structures, a television, and a
car, told me as an example of why technology is so great how she had been able to
watch the United States election the previous week. She told me she had been riveted
by it and that she had found it “so exciting”. She even had a favorite; she was routing
for Bush. 32 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, South Korean and American
culture are spreading through the newly installed media outlets and infiltrating
Mongolian society at a startling rate. In only 14 years, even countryside life is being
substantially affected.
Mongolia is becoming westernized. With the fall of the Soviet Union
imminent, Mongolian policy experts and political elites spent 1989 searching for a
third party to “guarantee national security and support modernization” in the coming
vacuum of Soviet withdrawal. 33 Living perpetually in the Soviet/Chinese nutcracker,
Mongolia had no choice but to cooperate with its two superpower neighbors, yet
turning to either of them to balance out the other was out of the question. Russia lay
in shambles economically and politically, and distrust of the Chinese people ran as
high as ever in Mongolia. In a survey of the Mongolian population conducted at the
time asking who Mongolia should turn to for economic support, China only garnered
6.2% of the responses, with Russia the non-option looming at 35.2% and America
registering a solid 25.6%. Nonetheless, in order to balance out these two great powers,
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Mongolia needed a third party, a third neighbor as proposed by James Baker. Nearly
fifteen years later it seems Mongolia has found that neighbor in the international
democratic community, led by none other than the United States of America.
Even though the indicators listed above are currently clashing with a newly
imported democratic free market culture and the values and norms that it brings along
with it, I believe that they will be sorted out in the near future. As the indicators listed
in the first two sections yield to the pervasive and seductive influence of those listed
in the third, the Mongolian hybrid culture itself will once again begin to change,
transforming into a culture that works with the path that the political nation is taking.
As capitalist ideology leaks in new ideals, new standards, even new theoretical
lifestyles, first the hybrid city culture, then the old nomadic rural culture will begin to
dissolve from the inside out by popular demand and a desire for change. This process
of a new cultural framework being created as a reaction to national political changes
is the unavoidable process of cultural erosion and eventual dissolution.
The current catch-22 of the Mongolian meat industry is a prime example.
With Soviet aid gone, in order to bolster GDP and further national development
Mongolia is searching for ways to put itself onto the global scene as a serious market
player. In a country dominated by nomadic herding, advancing the meat industry to
accommodate serious international market sale would seem like a logical progression;
yet there is a catch. Nomadic herding has sustained itself as long as it has by virtue of
being protected from the outside world, shielded from competitive international
markets. Historically, herders have been able to provide their families with what they
need to live, and little more. This was one of the main reasons for the development of
a war culture as described in Part 1. In the new free market system the limit of how
much herders can produce in a rational way is already being pushed, yet meat

production in Mongolia is in no way prepared to support the Mongolian GDP. In
order to convert the Mongolian meat industry into an international meat machine,
enabling it to quantifiably boost Mongolian GDP beyond its current rates, a number of
changes would have to be enacted to the nomadic way of life that would almost
certainly alter the path of pastoralism forever. Transportation would have to be
formalized throughout the countryside, herders would need to raise their animals in
accordance with international health standards, etc. Shifting a pastoralist society to a
society that cranks out large numbers of meat products to be sold on an international
market with quality standards and deadlines would most certainly alter life on the
Mongolian steppes. However if the meat industry is not revolutionized, where is the
GDP boost going to come from? Looking into the issue further, which is not the
explicit purpose of this paper, variations of the above predicament are present in
virtually every case scenario, in every economic sector wherein Mongolia could
further their international market role. With possibilities expanding beyond any
previous horizons, the question is, does Mongolia really want America to be its third
neighbor?

PART 3: D E M O C R A T I Z A T I O N A N D A C H A N G I N G S O C I E T Y

All changes, even the most longed for, have their melancholy; for what
we leave behind us is a part of ourselves; we must die to one life before
we can enter another.
~Anatole France
He who rejects change is the architect of decay. The only human
institution which rejects progress is the cemetery.
~Harold Wilson

Since the transition to a democratic government over a decade ago, the
Mongolian political machine has met with significant resistance along the road to
modernization. An antiquated cultural legacy, a harsh and undesirable geographical
setting, and the lack of material infrastructure in all sectors, has led to many
challenges while trying to a build a democracy from the ground up in Mongolia. As
the democracy is formed, and the infrastructure that was so neglected by the Soviets
for so long begins to be installed through the introduction of foreign investment,
change can currently be seen everywhere. Yet I do not believe that even many of
those who advocate democracy in Mongolia as a harbinger of freedom and peace on
an intellectual level really understand the scope of what democracy entails, what it
necessitates, the cultural changes it bundles along with it. The progress of these
cultural changes and the path of democracy to which they are linked will be the story
of the next several decades in Mongolia.
DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE DOOR IN THE MIRAGE

The rapid collapse of the Soviet Union sent shockwaves through the
international community, shifting global politics away from an era dominated by cold
war tensions and ushering in a new era of internationalization dominated by
democratic free market economies. The most potent and immediate affects of the
collapse, however, rippled throughout the Soviet satellite community, vaulting the
newly autonomous nations into an involuntary vacuum that none of them could have

adequately prepared for. The numerous economies that had previously depended on
the Soviets for sustenance throughout Eastern Europe rapidly fell through the opened
floor. In the absence of international trade, imports became scarce and many
countries were hard pressed to provide basic supplies for their populations. Most
post-Soviet militaries were undermanned and under funded. In most cases,
governmental structures were left in shambles. These circumstances left the postSoviet countries desperately searching for partners outside of their previously
diminished sphere of communication in order to help them onto a new track.
The Mongolian situation was no different. In 1990, with the Soviet Union no
longer propping up the Mongolian economy it plummeted headlong into the abyss.
Imports were minimal due to a boost in prices making supplies scarce even until 1994,
when the rationing of bread finally ended. Poverty rose at a monumental rate,
growing from 0% income poverty in 1989 to over 26% only four years later in
1994. 34 Furthermore, these numbers are thought to be low by some statisticians due
to the difficulty of quantifying nomadic poverty and other inherent statistical biases
incorporated at the time of calculation. 35 Meanwhile, real wages in the cities were
“halved by 1992, and then declined again by a third in 1993”. 36 In the face of a
tremendous rise in oil prices, causing frequent power shortages that set back
production and affected transportation and a number of other pivotal amenities, the
government was forced into expansive budget cuts, slashing spending primarily in
education and healthcare. The four year period from 1990-1994 saw the rapid decay
of the benefits in those sectors that the Soviets had spent nearly 70 years building,
leaving a legacy of vacant hospitals and crumbling schools across the country. In
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addition, Mongolia had to face the international community without protection for the
first time in the 20th century, subjected to the influx of 90% of the century’s
developments rushing into the country in the mere 10% of the century that remained.
With all of these factors added up, it is not surprising that the transition period quickly
turned into more of a traumatized withdrawal phase from Soviet communism than a
sudden renaissance of liberal values and luxuries. This phase was marked not by the
exalted virtues of democracy, liberty, and free market opulence, but by extreme
poverty, low imports, the battle for uncontrolled media, cultural uncertainty, and the
creation of an entirely new governmental structure from the ground up.
Mongolia has yet to recover entirely from the 1990 collapse, either
economically or politically, yet advances are being made at remarkable speed in both
areas. Until 1990, the Soviets controlled Mongolia under a mono-party system
dominated entirely by the communist backed MPRP (Mongolian People’s
Revolutionary Party). With the fast death of political repression in 1990, a variety of
democratic parties began springing up to challenge the previously uncontested MPRP.
Of these new parties, the MDP (Mongolian Democratic Party) and MSDP (Mongolian
Social Democratic Party) were the two largest groups, occupying center right and
center left, respectively. Beyond these were a host of other democratic parties which
garnered less support, yet enough to stay competitive. That same year saw the first
ever free and fair democratic election held in Mongolia, drafting parliament members
into the old Soviet Hural, a bicameral parliament consisting of 450 seats. With the
consolidation of smaller democratic parties not having taken place yet, and elections
being run on a plurality system, or First Past the Post system, the former communists
took 60% of the seats. The grab bag of non-aligned democratic parties took the other
40%.

During the next two years the elected parliament wrote a new constitution for
Mongolia, including delineations for the restructuring of the previously totalitarian
pseudo-governmental organization. The old Hural became a unicameral parliament
consisting of 76 seats to be filled by elected officials from various parties, the
parliament would in turn appoint the cabinet and the elected president would appoint
the judges. The new parliament also organized in the constitution a system of checks
and balances to be carried out in the new governmental structure resembling that of
the United States, with the three branches of government responsible for vetoing one
another on legislation and appointments. During this time many of the smaller
democratic parties merged into a democratic coalition union under the MDP name and
began forming grassroots networks throughout the countryside in order to further
support.
The effort paid off, and in 1996, the MDP Coalition won 50 of the 76 seats in
the new unicameral parliament, taking the control of Mongolia away from the MPRP
for the first time in 70 years. However with majority consensus set at 2/3, the
democrats were 1 seat short. Although the MPRP had only won 25 seats they were
able to win over the one independent that had been elected, the 76th seat, enabling
them to block legislation at their whim. With a parliament divided between two
diametrically opposed political parties concerned more with their private ideologies
than national progression, a stagnant term followed in which little was accomplished.
The MDP coalition was founded in the hopes of expediting the transition to a
democratic market economy through the installation of dramatic reforms along
capitalist lines. This primarily included the opening of markets, privatization of assets,
and decentralization of social benefit programs and institutions. The MPRP, on the
other hand, became increasingly socialist and decreasingly communist along Soviet

lines post 1990, favoring the continuing subsidization of social institutions, a strong
welfare system, and decreased privatization while still opening the country in some
capacity to international markets and media. Nevertheless, MPRP members would
simply walk out of parliament if they did not fully support any bill or legislation item
proposed by the MDP Coalition members. This created an atmosphere of stunted
growth from 1996-2000, where radical initiatives encompassing the mindset of the
elected MDP government officials were shot down internally by the 26 seat veto set
up by the opposing MPRP. The result was a torpid, even retrogressive, few years in
which the Mongolian population became increasingly wary of the democrats as
substantial visible benefits did not manifest themselves on the MDP’s watch.
During the 2000 election the MPRP effectively used the instability they had
essentially created during the last term, in conjunction with the MDP Coalition’s
decision to once again splinter into a dozen shards, to take absolute control of the
government. The MPRP won 72 of the 76 seats, an unprecedented number even
granted the above concessions, with the democrats only taking 4 seats separately.
This created a virtual one party parliament dominated by the socialists, who at this
time dropped the last pretenses of direct communist ties, becoming the primary party
occupying the central left. In America, bizarrely enough, this is a position held by
none other than the Democratic Party. Even stranger still, during the following
election of 2004 the Mongolian democrats once again banded together under a
common goal with a common name, the Motherland Democratic Party, a politically
contradictory name for the ages. With the Revolutionary Party becoming centrist to
the point of occupying the center left, the democrats chose a name which combines
modern democracy with a less than subversive hint at a none other than a Soviet

coined term for the national homeland. The 2004 election was a veritable mess of
centrist movement.
With both parties rushing towards each other to bolster support among
alienated voters in both camps, while trying to simultaneously retain a strong home
base of support, the 2004 election resulted in a dead heat. The MPRP won 36 seats,
the Motherland Democratic Coalition won 36 seats, and three seats went to
independents, all of which had come from the previously disbanded MDP. With
parties merging towards the middle, elections split 50/50, and a divided voting
population, the parallels to the current political situation in the United States are
striking. One nation progressing, the other regressing, both split between those who
want to move towards the future and those who either want to hold onto, or revert to,
a mutated form of a long lost past. 37
Mongolia is also recovering economically. Between the last year of Soviet
Communism in 1989 when 30% of Mongolia’s GDP (Gross National Product) was
contributed by the Soviets, and four years later in 1993, GDP fell 22%. This
coincided with, partially creating and partially reacting to, the complete disintegration
of the Mongolian economy during the transition period. However GDP began rising
at a stabilized rate hovering above 3% in 1994, and has sustained this approximate
growth rate until today.
These growth rates were accounted for due to production increases in almost
every sector as the economy recovered from a 30% loss of GDP, with the removal of
Soviet capital. By 1998, with the economy at least partially back on its feat,
agriculture, trade, and material accounted for 32.8% of the GDP, industry for 24.1
37
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(with 40% of that coming from the mining of metal ores), technical provision for
18.9%, services for 14.2, and the remaining 10.2% coming from other sources. The
agricultural increase was due in large part to the privatization of animals which
allowed animal numbers to rise well above what herders were motivated to sustain
under communism. It was several years before privatization of livestock took affect,
however, as animals take time to grow old enough to be sold. Likewise, with the
departure of the Soviets, foreign mining companies were able to enter Mongolia,
partially bolstering the mining output which had alone risen to 10% of the total GDP
by 2000. 38 In addition Mongolia found a new trading partner to the south in China,
with nearly 60% of national exports going to that vast country in 2000. With the
added possibilities of animal production, the already flourishing cashmere industry
grew even larger, accounting for “16% of exports [and] a quarter of the world's
cashmere [stock]” by 2000. 39 All of these increases, and more, have added up to the
effective bounce back of the Mongolian economy on the industrial level, an economy
that Michael Richmond of the US Embassy in Ulan Baatar describes as “looking as
though it were entering a boom”. 40 However none of this negates the fact that
bouncing back to a mediocre economy does not make the economy any better than it
was before the crash, and that on the ground, Mongolia is still an infrastructurally
lacking, economically brittle country with underinvestment from abroad, scant
resources, and a long way to go.
Having made the transition to a capitalist democracy, however, the potential is
there. Theoretically, democratic capitalism opens the door in the mirage to a
thousand possibilities that were previously only a thousand drops of dew entangled in
an elusive vapor trail dancing on the horizon. Having attained a tenuous stability in
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the wake of tumultuous political change, the current task for Mongolia is to see how
far past a status quo which is aspired to by poor nations and dreaded by wealthy ones
the country can go.

THE UNDEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

There are currently numerous road blocks strewn in the path of the Mongolian
democracy that are preventing the country from moving forward at an accelerated
growth speed. By most unbiased accounts corruption is rampant within the
government. This point of view is most clearly expressed by S. Oyun, a member the
Mongolian parliament who has fought throughout her career for the transparency the
government is lacking. Although there are no statistics indicating the degree to which
corruption is an issue in the Mongolian power structure, it would be impossible for
there to be without transparency, it is clear that there is corruption throughout the
governmental structures. For lack of more tangible evidence, the presence of
corruption is verified beyond the shadow of a doubt given merely the degree to which
most government members have resisted the transparency movement. Most officials
have shied away from declaring their salaries publicly as a slug shying away from salt;
afraid of melting into a little puddle.
The presence of corruption trickles down through the entire Mongolian
infrastructure, affecting the degree to which foreign investors are willing to participate
in the Mongolian economy, the degree to which the economy itself functions, and
most importantly, the degree to which the Mongolian people believe in their own
government as a rational entity worthy of the nation’s trust. What is more, campaign
finance reforms are virtually non-existent in Mongolia, leading to an economically

opaque political process from start to finish. Those with the most capital and
campaign investment can sway the most voters, entering into a political position
where they can make the most money, covering it all up through the skilled
manipulation of media sources under the control of various interested beneficiaries
who, more probably than not, funded the candidates campaign in the first place.
Freedom of the press and media outlets is another major issue in the current
Mongolian political arena. Although 1990 saw the official liberation of all media, a
move ratified in the constitution two years later, this dream is a long way from
becoming a reality in Mongolia. Most of the papers, if not all, in the country are
controlled by an interest group. Although the MPRP is the only party to actually own
a newspaper, every other Mongolian newspaper is tied to a corporation or individual
with explicit political opinions based on party lines. 41 Much of the television and
radio media is still run by the state, meaning that the political inclination of these
outlets sways back and forth with the balance of power ushered in by each new
election. However with the growth of the internet in Mongolia, new fair and free
media sources are beginning to populate the dot com world as the price of creating
such a news source is vastly less than tackling a newspaper, television show, or radio
program. Perhaps in the future this will affect media across the boards, stirring the
true emancipation of subversively controlled media in Mongolia.
Furthermore, Mongolia’s economic potential is currently being held in check
due to the trickle down effects of a struggling democracy, and the contradictory
desires to save cultural heritage and the Mongolian wilderness in the face of economic
exploitation. It is difficult for Mongolia to court foreign investment away from their
Chinese neighbor, a country that due to many factors, including predominantly
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strength in population numbers, can provide cheap labor on a scale not possible in
Mongolia. Add to this the scare factors of corruption in Mongolian politics, a sign of
instability that makes foreign investors wary, and investment is an uphill battle all the
way. In addition, industries such as mining and meat producers are currently being
held in check to some degree by the movement to protect in Mongolia. The meat
industry could bring down nomadic herding, and the mining industry, with its
enormous potential for international trade and profit, could literally destroy vast
sections of the Mongolian wilderness. This is the inherent negative that comes along
with the positive potential of capitalist democracies; how to enter the system without
embarking on a myopic path that will lead to expansion in the short term, but will
eventually turn Mongolia into a ravaged wasteland. The ability of a nation to soar
within the capitalist system is irrelevant if, during the process, the nation destroys the
ground on which they will inevitably have to land sometime in the imminent future.
It is my theory that all of the above democratic and economic problems, and
all of the social indicators of resistance, are the result of a contradiction wherein the
Mongolian culture is changing slower than its political arena. This phenomenon is not
surprising given the 14 year super speed trip Mongolia has been launched on. In the
fallout of a system that protected a cultural legacy well beyond its natural lifespan,
these challenges are caused by the leftovers of nomadic culture crossing paths with
democracy. Add to the fray the scraps of ingrained Soviet mentality that continue to
linger in Mongolia and there is a veritable jumble of undemocratic legacy left in
house, a legacy that democracy is currently clashing with. The challenges that have
risen out of these cultural incompatibilities can only be overcome if the Mongolian
civil society becomes actively involved, in democratic terms, necessitating another
fundamental shift in cultural values.

Democracy is fundamentally different from previous dictatorial regimes in
that it requires the active participation of the public in order to succeed. During the
neo-feudal years the population did not have to consent to their rulers, they were
made to consent whether they wished to or not. The same held true under Soviet rule;
active participation was irrelevant. However this is no longer the case. In order to
censor the democracy in which they live, Mongolians are required to, for the first time
in the history of the country, become involved in the political process. Culturally,
however, there is no legacy of involvement in the national rule, leading to the need for
another cultural transformation in Mongolia in order to once again accommodate new
governmental organizations. However this transformation may spell the end of
traditions that have been carried in Mongolia since long before democracy was even a
dot on the world scene.
The bribing culture needs to be curtailed on the side of the authorities, and
stop being accepted on the side of the population. On a trip to Northern Mongolia our
van was stopped as we crossed Aimag borders. The border police ended up accusing
our driver of not having a medical kit in the car, and the driver paid them the
equivalent of five US dollars to placate them and get us across the border. I was
amazed at how natural it seemed, and how little everyone else was surprised by what
had happened, even though the driver was angry at having to have paid the five
dollars. When I suggested that the driver check police records in Ulan Baatar when
he returned to make sure the five dollars had made it to the state coffers and not
stayed in the policeman’s pocket, he laughed. In fact all the Mongolians in the van
laughed. Who would do all that work just to check up on five dollars? Touché,
however it was not the five dollars that concerned me, it was the larger bribery
problem in general. Bribery in Mongolia is able to survive simply because it happens

in such small incidences, involving just little enough money that no one deems the
needed effort to resist worthwhile. The result is that policemen are never censored for
their actions, and bribery continues to be a nationwide problem.
Likewise, the peculiar form of apathy inherited from previous autocratic
governments that has many voters in the countryside voting without a clear idea of
who they are voting for and why, needs to change. Over 60% of those interviewed in
the countryside who indicated that they and their entire group of friends vote, also
indicated that not much information on the political process or political parties
reaches them. This leaves voting as more of a shot in the dark in most cases than an
informed decision indicating a preference of how the country should be run. A
smaller percentage of interviewees indicated that they receive information, but that
they do not think that the government has the power to influence their lives in a
substantial enough way to matter. It is partially this attitude that has led the striking
lack of political participation beyond voting among common Mongolians, as indicated
by the absolute shortage of political rallies and demonstrations not only now, but also
under the Soviets. Apathy disguised in a rather meaningless high vote count is still
apathy, no matter how misleading the numbers. The Mongolian population,
especially those in the countryside, need to become actively involved in politics,
necessitating broader communication networks, freer media, and a cultural shift
towards desiring those amenities which will help them connect to the informational
hub of Ulan Baatar. In order to accommodate a fluid, rational, democracy changes
need to be enacted that will necessarily rock the foundations of the nomadic
pastoralist legacy in Mongolia.
THE BEGINNINGS OF RADICAL CHANGE: FOLLOW THE URBAN LEADER

Change is becoming apparent everywhere in Mongolia. As a widespread
phenomenon, this transformation it is not only limited to the city, as discussed at
length in Part 2, but has already began to creep out into the vast countryside regions,
albeit at a slower pace. The most poignant examples of this change that I came across
in the Mongolian countryside are taking place in the Gobi desert. Vegetable growing
is becoming wide spread in the central Gobi since the introduction of agriculture to
the area in 1990. What is conceived of as the most barren area of Mongolia, an
already strikingly barren country, now produces some 25% of Mongolian vegetable
stock. The farmers in the regions like to boast that most of the vegetables one eats in
café’s in Ulan Baatar come from their vegetable patches. Upon entering almost every
ger that I visited in the region I was immediately offered pickles, or cabbage salad, or
even in one case, tomato jam. As it was winter, the gers were overflowing with the
canned vegetables stock produced during the summer months; they were stuffed
under beds, spilling out of makeshift cabinets, even sitting on top of television sets.
Vegetables were everywhere, and what is more, they were delicious.
This new vegetable movement has many nomads settling so that they can plant
gardens in a return to an agricultural way of life last seen in Mongolia over ten
thousand years ago. With new advancements in agricultural technology, finally
allowed in with the departure of the Soviets, these Gobi farmers are able to work the
soil into arability, something that had proved impossible in the area up until 1990.
Furthermore, with the arrival of Ivanhoe, an international Mining company based in
Canada, the area is already seeing a rise in living conditions in the towns, prompting
citification. The company is currently scoping a potentially massive iron deposit in
the region, and even though the company has yet to fully commit to the mine, changes
are already coming. Hambog sum, a small sum center virtually in the middle of

nowhere, yet near the Ivanhoe site, has a completely renovated school, several little
hotels, and a Xaan bank branch, all of which have recently sprung up. People are
flocking to the city, settling either on the outskirts in ger districts or moving into the
city proper in order to take advantage of the school and other amenities. All this and
the mine has yet to open. When it does, it will absorb an approximate 6,000 workers
from the region. The affects of that change will be even less gradual.
All in all, throughout the central Gobi region the nomadic people were
surprisingly modernized. The gers were the largest I have seen in Mongolia and most
had small hobbit hole-like entranceways to shelter the door from sand storms and
provide additional storage room. An overwhelming proportion of the families I
interviewed had permanent barns and pens linked to their gers, almost 90%, with 63%
of families already settled permanently or planning to settle in the next year. In
addition, just over 50% of families had televisions, all of them linked to satellite
systems, and all but one family had a motorized vehicle, with 20% of those being cars
and the remaining 80% being Russian motorcycles.
Families which I encountered in the central and northern regions had fewer
amenities and generally were less likely to be settled. In the central region of
Delgerkhan, 25% of families had televisions with only half of those linked to satellite
systems, 75% of families had motorcycles, and over 50% of the families had
sedentary structures, yet only one of those families was actually settled, moving into
the sum center for the winter and living off the money generated by renting out a
sulfur spring near the ger in the countryside during the summer. In the Northern
region of Darkhan, the numbers were even smaller. Approximately 25% of families
recorded had televisions, just over 50% had motorized vehicles, the majority being
cars, and only 1 of the families interviewed was permanently settled. I would

attribute the lowness of these numbers to two primary factors. First of all the southern
region has had much more exposure to modernization, due to foreign and domestic
interest in mineral deposits and the comparative ease of travel year round. Secondly it
is important to note that all of the families I interviewed in the north and central
communities were hand picked by SIT school for students to stay with. These
families do not necessarily represent the average Mongolian family in the region as
they were hand selected for compatibility with the goals of the SIT program. This
could have led to many families who are carrying on primarily traditional lifestyles
being picked, and thus interviewed. In the Gobi, families were selected at random
while driving across the desert, thus representing a much more natural, and in my
opinion, accurate reflection of the realities of nomadic modernization.
The margin of error in the numbers I collected in the field is admittedly large.
There are numerous biases that could offset the numbers substantially, yet the general
outcome drawn could not, in my opinion, be fundamentally altered by any amount of
offset. Twenty years ago none of those families would have had televisions, satellite
connections, motorcycles, or would be considering settling down to grow vegetables.
The purpose of my surveys was not to draw completely accurate statistical numbers
on the nomadic possession of modern amenities, it was to draw a general conclusion
that things in the countryside are changing, and changing quickly. It is beyond a
shadow of a doubt in my mind, as based on the research I conducted, that they are.
What is more, in all cases, the nomadic families interviewed were themselves quick to
comment on the numerous changes of the last decade and a half. Purevsuren, a 68
year old nomad who does not even own a ger but travels truly nomadically from the
home of one family member to another, was quick to comment on how much has
changed during his lifetime. He said that nomadic life is becoming markedly more

sedentary with the addition of new, heavier, modern amenities that are weighing the
nomads down into settling. 42 Ayosh, a 58 year old settled nomad in the Gobi who
now grows vegetables said that here life has been divided into two distinct parts. 43
When she was young technology was a dream of the future, and now she lives a life in
which “the dream has come true”. 44 She added that now she can even talk to her son
who is living in Korea. Tsempil, another farmer in the Gobi corroborated that thought,
saying that it is as if she has lived “two totally different lives”. 45 Tsempil is settled
with a television, a satellite hook up, and a car, growing vegetables in the middle of
the Gobi desert.
However when asked if nomadic cultural traditions may disappear in the
coming years, even in the face of changes already taking place, pastoralists
unequivocally answered negatively across the boards. Monkchimeg, the same herder
who told me he valued his work in terms of a quantifiable income, told me while
sitting next to his television, with a barn and a new motorcycle outside, that all of the
new technological advances do not make nomads want to be more western. 46 He was
certain that they will never abandon their cultural heritage, yet he was sitting in an
environment that was living proof that they already are.
Tsetsegdelger, a woman living in the middle of the Gobi with a huge herd of
camels, spoke to the intricacies of the situation quite profoundly. She held the same
conviction of most other herders that nomads will never stop moving as they will
always need to follow their animals that that will always be in search of better
pastureland. 47 However she added that cultural traditions might change, alongside
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continued nomadic herding patterns, to such a great extent that nomadic culture will
no longer be recognizable as such even though the people will still technically be
moving nomadically. 48 Ayosh thought the same thing. She said that she could not
predict whether culture would change or not, but she sees that many herders are
already changing on a physical level. They are “settling, getting televisions, and
herding with cars”. 49 However she was quick to comment that “others are still
completely nomadic and don’t have any technology”. 50 The change has already
begun, and I do not think it will stop, not because it can’t be stopped, but because the
population does not want to stop it. The myopic view that many of the physical
changes taking place in the herding community will never affect their cultural legacy
is merely a symptom of a culture in transition that is difficult to analyze from within
that cultural group itself. The seed planted, it is only a matter of time before rapid
changes kept dormant for over a century, engulf Mongolia in a flood of
transformation.
THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION CATALYST

With two opposing forces clashing in a struggle which will eventually decide
the future of the Mongolian nation, the progress of democracy will inevitably be
marked by the progressive demise of traditional culture in practice. On many levels,
this is a much less disheartening concept than it may seem at first glance. Nomads in
the country have incredibly tough lives, lives more suited to past centuries than to the
one we are currently in. Some of the younger families I met even admitted to me that
they do not like their lives, that they are “bored” and that they are trying to move into
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the city in order to give their children a better life than they had. 51 How can
foreigners rationally lament the downfall of a lifestyle we ourselves would not be
happy living for an extended period of time, like a lifetime? In some cases, the
transition will surely be cause for happiness, and as such should not be seen in such a
negative light, predominantly by outside viewers. No change comes without loss,
while holding natural change at bay is even more lamentable than the necessary losses
of an evolving world.
By the same token, however, sometimes it is only to clear what you have lost
once it is gone. Democracy is a double edged sword; it can elevate the standard of
living in a country, yet the country has to sell its soul to capitalism and free market
reforms in order to do so. The transition to a capitalist system from a traditionalist
one imbued with lasting cultural legacies is bound to see the vast overhaul of nomadic
traditions in accordance with modernizing trends. In Mongolia, this is happening in
several steps. With the opening of international markets and the destruction of
previous information boundaries, global media has set up an image of perfect
modernization for everyone to see, dangling it like a carrot in front of the Mongolian
population. Although this image of modernization may turn out to be nothing but a
mirage, it looks and feels and smells wholly real, making it an enticing aspiration. 52
This is represented in Mongolia by the infiltration of, most notably, American and
South Korean media, serving as an intoxicant to Mongolians, making them want to be
more like what they see, to conform to an international capitalist methodology that
could bring them the luxury and style they perceive abroad. In the Mongolian case,
switching to a democratic marketocracy is the way in which the country can open the
door in that previously unattainable mirage, stepping into a whole new world that was
51
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formerly nothing but a fantasy like dream. Whether that dream turns out to be a
viable route to national progress, or, in fact, nothing more than a fancy mirage, only
time will tell. Yet democratic reforms are the way in which Mongolia can paint for
itself the door in the mirage, creating an opening through which to enter.
Stepping through that door, however, necessitates a radical shift away from
the trappings of previous old world legacies in order to facilitate movement towards a
culture compatible with the newly appointed political systems. This leaves the
present as an oddly anomalous time in Mongolia, a time stuck halfway between
Chiingis Khan and Burger King, a time when the old has not yet fully subsided and
the new has not yet fully been born. It is as if Mongolia is hovering between two
worlds, the one behind the door which is being left behind, and the one on the other
side of the door which has not yet come entirely into view. Only through fully
committing to democratic reforms and the capitalist ideology can Mongolia step all
the way through that door in the mirage and find out what really lies behind the façade.
However there is scant middle ground. In the global game of national political
reconstruction and international ideological co-optation, it tends to be all or nothing;
fully in, or fully out. Mongolia has to choose either to step past the door frame, or
retreat, continuing to live with the possibilities of the mirage haunting the national
dream. I believe the decision has already been made, a belief that has been backed up
through four months of experiences living in Mongolia and numerous interviews
conducted throughout the country. As Mongolia chooses its path, the progress of
democracy and free market reforms will mark the progress of the disintegration of
traditional cultures in practice. Herders will begin to herd, as has already happened,
with motorcycles and cars. Some pastoralists will begin to choose agriculture as new
technological advances inundate the country making it possible to work the land.

Increasing amounts of the political elite will rise from urban areas due to higher rates
of schooling in those regions. 53 This will shift the political path of the country
towards urbanized desires and away from the home base of nomadic legacy in the
countryside. Tourism will rise as more and more westerners visit Mongolia, each one
taking away with them a little bit of that very wildness they made the pilgrimage half
way across the world to experience, until Mongolia becomes as popular and as
common as Thailand, as Brazil, as the Caribbean. In Mongolia the stakes are high.
The success of the national passage through that door in the mirage into a
democratized capitalist society means the difference between the developing state
succeeding and failing, and in my opinion, between nomadic tradition in practice
living and dying out.
The prevalence of aged cultures in developing nations succumbing to the
narcotic of modernization, changing, and eventually disintegrating, is a phenomenon
currently sweeping the world over. Through global media, people in developing
countries worldwide are realizing what they don’t have. Of course this new
information unfortunately does not come with disclaimer tags informing them of how
much they do have, things that most modernized nations ceased to value long ago.
Nevertheless, as these countries advance towards modernization following an
externally sparked, internal impetus to change, they will slowly lose the cultural
heritages of the past in practice, creating new cultures and new national
transformations, as has happened time and time again throughout the history of the
world. Mongolia is an exemplar of this current widespread evolution of a struggle as
old as man, the struggle forwards, towards modernization, and away from traditional
cultures that themselves were once the modernizing forces of change.
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In Mongolia, nomadic culture, after facilitating peaceful transitions during the
Soviet takeover and subsequent crumble, created a society which is proving difficult
to assimilate into the global community of democracies and free market economies.
In the future, Mongolian values will shift, transforming into something unique and
new, an entirely fresh breed of Mongolian culture built upon, but also necessitating,
the dissipation of the old heritage in practice. This transition is not inevitably
negative, as demoralizing as it may seem to scores of foreigners. Many of these
foreigners simply lament the loss of past cultures in their own nations, whether
subconsciously or otherwise, transferring these feelings onto the shoulders of
developing countries abroad instead of dealing with the realities at home. In my
opinion, it is actually quite an uplifting concept, the chance to perpetually improve,
bettering ourselves and our surroundings. Nor is it by any means a new thing. The
evolution of culture is the way of the world, and to try to stop it would be to deny the
motion of the entire history of mankind and the movement of a constantly evolving
universe. What is important is to work to ensure that the evolution always stays a
progression, that children have a more relenting earth to live on than their parents, that
the passage of time people become kinder, better educated, healthier, and more
conscious of their place in the world, and that no one is left impoverished in the wake
of dramatic changes. In short, the goal is to avoid regression. This is the task set for
Mongolia in the next century; to create a world beyond the door in the mirage that
validates beyond the shadow of a doubt the unconscious decision to have disrupted a
millennium of cultural, historical, and civilizational advancements, leaving them
behind to be written into the dust covered chronicles of the past.
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Mendsaikhan
Enkh-Amgalan
Aahuu
Tsegmed
Total Percentages
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Batjargal
Tsedevsuren
Tsempil
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-
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